Introduction
The game theoretical analysis of the formation and stability of international environmental agreements (IEAs) has become an important branch in the environmental economics literature over the last two decades. Roughly speaking, two approaches can be distinguished: repeated games and coalition games. 1 Repeated games analyze whether compliance with treaty obligations can be enforced in the long run with credible threats of punishment, invoking equilibrium concepts as for instance subgame perfect and renegotiation-proof equilibrium (Barrett 1994a , b, 1999 , Endres/Finus 1998 , Finus/Rundshagen 1998a , b, Finus/Tjotta 2002 , Mäler 1994 and Stähler 1996 . Coalition games analyze membership in IEAs, applying concepts of cooperative and non-cooperative game theory. The cooperative approach is based on the characteristic function that assigns a worth to coalitions. The worth is the aggregate payoff to a coalition that it can secure for itself irrespective of the behavior of countries outside the coalition. The focus of the analysis is on checking stability of the efficient grand coalition implementing a socially optimal emission vector, invoking the concept of the core (Chander/Tulkens 1995 , Germain/Tulkens/de Zeeuw 1998 . The efficient solution is stable (i.e., lies in the core) if no subgroup of countries has an incentive to form an other coalition, assuming that remaining countries break up into singletons playing either a minimax, maximin or Nash equilibrium strategy. In contrast, the non-cooperative approach is based on the valuation function that assigns an individual payoff to each country for each possible partition of countries, called coalition structure. For a fixed coalition structure payoffs follow from some assumption how countries choose their emissions. The standard assumption is that coalition members act as a single player maximizing the aggregate payoff to their coalition but behave non-cooperatively towards outsiders (see section 2).
Equilibrium coalition structures are determined by applying the concept of internal and external stability (Barrett 1994b , Bauer 1992 , Carraro/Siniscalco 1993 , Hoel 1992 , Hoel/Schneider 1997 Jeppesen/Andersen 1998 and Rubio/Ulph 2001 . Internal stability means that no coalition member has an incentive to leave its coalition to become a singleton and external stability that no singleton has an incentive to join a coalition, assuming that the remaining countries do not revise their membership decision. Except Bauer (1992) all contributions have restricted coalition formation to a single coalition, allowing to group countries into signatories and non-signatories.
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For an overview of different approaches see Finus (2001 and 2003) .
Recently, there has been a development of new approaches and concepts in game theory that we call "new coalition theory". 2 "New coalition theory" belongs to non-cooperative game theory and is based on the valuation function. Compared to the cooperative approach this has at least two advantages (see Bloch 1997) . First, assuming that countries pursue their selfinterest as rational players, it seems natural to conclude that countries will base their decision of membership on individual payoffs and not on the aggregate payoff to their coalition even if transfers are possible. Second, the valuation function does better account for spillovers between countries and coalitions. Since spillovers are an important source for free-riding in international treaty formation, the non-cooperative approach is better suited to rationalize inefficient IEAs, which, of course, most treaties are. Compared to the concept of internal and external stability these new developments have the advantage that they do not restrict ex-ante coalition formation to a single non-trivial coalition 3 but allow for the co-existence of multiple coalitions. Moreover, they invoke stability concepts that consider not only deviations by single countries but also by subgroups of countries where subgroups must not necessarily form one new coalition as assumed by the core but may form any partition. Finally, compared to the "classical" cooperative and non-cooperative approaches, new coalition theory draws a conceptual line between the rules of coalition formation (summarized in the definition of a coalition game) and stability (summarized in the definition of an equilibrium concept). Thus, differences in equilibrium coalitions can be unambiguously attributed to different stability concepts and different rules of coalition formation. Since the rules of coalition formation can be interpreted as the institutional setting in which treaty formation take place (Ecchia/Mariotti 1998) , policy conclusions about the optimal design of agreements are possible. Moreover, the reaction of countries after a deviation do not follow from ad hoc assumptions but follow from the rules of coalition formation and can therefore be related to the rational behavior of countries. For an excellent overview see Bloch (1997) and Yi (1997) . Applications in the context of IEAs may be found in Carraro (2000) , Carraro/Marchiori (2002) , Carraro/Marchiori/Oreffice (2001), Finus (2002) and Finus/Rundshagen (2001 
Model

Introduction
Coalition formation is modeled as a two-stage game. In the first stage countries decide on their membership in a coalition, in the second stage coalition members choose their emissions. 
is a function mapping coalition structures into a vector of emission levels and , is a function mapping emission levels into welfare levels.
For the first stage we consider six different coalition games, representing six different institutional rules how coalitions form. For the second stage we consider only one rule that assigns a unique vector of individual payoffs for each possible coalition structure. This implies that countries choosing a membership strategy in the first stage know for each coalition game the implications in the second stage. Hence, games can be solved by backwards induction. Consequently, we start in the following by describing first stage 2 and subsequently we move on to explain stage 1 of the coalition formation game.
Second Stage of the Coalition Formation Game
Let the payoff to country i in the global emission game be given by Nash equilibrium strategy in terms of emissions. Consequently, the singleton coalition structure (grand coalition) implies an equilibrium emission vector corresponding to the "classical" Nash equilibrium (social optimum). Uniqueness of the emission vector e for each coalition structure cOEC is related to the properties of the benefit and damage cost functions and follows from standard theorems. The assumption of an interior equilibrium eases
Of course, it would be sufficient to write only , but it turns out that is more convenient for later proofs. show that there is a class of transfer schemes that preserves the positive externality property.
For establishing this property, we need two lemmas. and the assumptions about the properties of the benefit and damage cost functions, the following must be true:
Lemma 1: Merging of Coalitions and Global Emissions
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(e (c )) (e (c )) (e (c )) Proof: From Lemma 1 we have e ( after a merger. Hence, the following must be
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Thus, Lemma 2 states that outsiders not involved in a merger will increase their emissions ( ) or at best do not revise their emission choices (ḱ 0 φ >´í 0 φ = ). Lemma 1 and Lemma 2 allow stating the following result.
Proposition 1a: Positive Externality Property (PEP): No Transfers
Assume no transfers and let c be a coalition not involved in a merger which implies that coalition structure c changes to coalition structure c , then in the global emission game
" kOE :
Proof: Global emissions decrease after a merger by Lemma 1 and outsiders emission increase or remain unchanged by Lemma 2, hence benefits of outsiders increase or remain unchanged and their damage costs decrease. Consequently, outsiders´ welfare must increase through a merger (Q.E.D.).
The striking feature about Proposition 1a is that in the global emission game the PEP holds at a very general level, that is, for any type of welfare function and any type of heterogeneity between countries. The PEP has an immediate implication for stability of coalition structures in the various coalition games considered in the next subsection: if a country or group of countries change their membership strategy, that is, they leave their coalition, join an other coalition or form their own coalition, the harshest possible punishment is that all coalitions of the remaining countries break up into singletons. We will discuss this issue in more detail in section 3 and turn now to transfers.
For our level of generality it suffices to show that there exist a transfer scheme for which the PEP holds. We consider a modification of the transfer scheme proposed by Chander/Tulkens (1995 and which comes close to that applied in Eyckmans/Tulkens (1999): 
First Stage of the Coalition Formation Games
In this subsection we define and discuss six coalition games that imply different rules how coalitions can form. All games assume that countries simultaneously announce their coalition 6
Technically speaking, this implies that superadditivity may not hold in our context. Only for linear damage cost functions there are no leakages and hence superadditivity generally holds.
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In Chander/Tulkens (1995 and 
Thus in the OMG a country can join any coalition it wants. This strong assumption, however, seems not entirely in line with the notion of voluntary participation in IEAs that is one important feature reminiscent to the problem of cooperation in international pollution control. has been proposed by Bloch (1997) and formalized by Rundshagen (2002) . Conceptually, only a slight modification of Definition 2 is required, adding to the strategy set an address 0 and specifying the coalition function such that countries announcing 0 remain singletons. 
For instance, recall our previous example that assumed 1 2 3 1 σ = σ = σ = and σ = so that c={{1, 2, 3}, {4}} forms and where we argued that if country 3 changed its address to , then c={{1, 2}, {3, 4}} will come about. In the ROMG player 4 can announce σ = instead of so that no other player can force him into a coalition. However, also in the ROMG, any player not in coalition {1, 2, 3} can join this coalition. This is different in the next four exclusive membership games. 
As it will turn out from a comparison with other exclusive membership games below, in the EMDG only a weak degree of unanimity is required to form a coalition.
The exclusive membership Γ-game (EMGG) goes back to Von Neumann/Morgenstern (1944) and has been reintroduced by Hart/Kurz (1983) The exclusive membership H-game (EMHG) has been invented by Finus/Rundshagen (2003) and implies a modification not only in terms of the coalition function but also in terms of strategies compared to the EMDG and EMGG. In terms of coalition strategies, countries´ announcements comprise not only a list of countries with which they would like to form a coalition but also a list with their preferred residual coalition structure. The coalition function determines coalition structure c not in one but in two steps. The first step resembles that in the EMGG: countries which have each other on the list to form a coalition will be in one coalition if and only if all members on a list make the same proposal. This leads to a "preliminary" Thus, the whole coalition formation process can be interpreted as follows. In the first step it is checked whether "internal lists" match, that is, lists of countries with which a country wants to form a coalition. The preliminary formation process requires a degree of unanimity of the G-type. In the second step it is checked whether "external lists" match, that is, lists of partitions formed by external countries. Here, only lists of members in the same coalition but not of all countries must match to form a coalition. This implies de facto that a degree of unanimity of the D-type with respect to the external list is required to form a coalition. This suggests that a game can be constructed which also requires a degree of unanimity of the Gtype for the external list. This is done below. For reference reason we call the degree of unanimity required to form a coalition in terms of the entire EMHG "strong" in order to distinguish it from that in the next game that we call "super strong".
The exclusive membership I-game (EMIG) is due to Finus/Rundshagen (2003) and is identical to the EMHG in terms of strategies but different in terms of the coalition function. In this game not only must all members of a coalition propose the same external list but all countries to form coalitions. Thus, taken together, a coalition only forms if and only if all countries make the same proposal for the entire coalition structure, comprising an internal and external
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There is a close resemblance between core-stability and a strong Nash equilibrium in this game.
For details see Finus/Rundshagen (2003 In this section we compare stability of coalition structures in the six coalition games. We consider two equilibrium concepts: Nash equilibrium and strong Nash equilibrium. A Nash equilibrium coalition structure, abbreviated NE, is derived from a vector of coalition strategies where no single country has an incentive to change its strategy (announcement),
given that other countries announce their equilibrium strategy. This is the familiar definition of Nash equilibrium, except that strategies are coalition and not economic (i.e., emission)
strategies. Similar, a strong Nash equilibrium coalition structure, abbreviated SNE, is a vector of coalition strategies where no subgroup of countries I Given that multiple deviations are a special case of single deviations (I S ={i}), it is evident that the set of SNE is a subset of NE, C . The reason why we consider not only SNE but also NE is that existence of NE is guaranteed under far more general conditions than of SNE.
Since some of the proofs in subsection 3.2 are instructive for establishing existence of equilibrium coalition structures in the various coalition games, we postpone the discussion until subsection 3.3.
SNE NE C ⊂
Comparison of Equilibrium Coalition Structures
For the analysis of stability it is helpful to note four things in advance. First, stability is We define strong Nash equilibrium in terms of a weak inequality to be consistent with the definition of Pareto-optimal coalition structures in subsection 3.3. A modification of this assumption would not affect the subsequent proofs.
coalition structure. 12 Hence, when analyzing stability of a coalition structure, it suffices that stability holds for one coalition strategy vector. Since the most favorable condition for stability in the exclusive membership D-and G-game is if each coalition member proposes exactly this coalition to which it belongs in c and in the exclusive membership H-and I-game if each country announces exactly coalition structure c, our proofs start from this assumption.
In the following we proceed in three steps to derive our final result. 
Proposition 2: Comparison of Equilibria in the OMG, ROMG and EMDG
Let the set of Nash and strong Nash equilibrium coalition structures (NE and SNE) For a NE, the same reasoning applies with
The intuition of Proposition 2 is the following. In all three games the indirect effect of a deviation is the same. If in the OMG and ROMG deviating countries change their address all other countries remain in their coalitions. In the EMDG the deviating countries change their list of countries with which they like to form a coalition. Due to weak unanimity to form coalitions, other countries will remain in their coalitions if some countries change their list.
However, the three games differ in their direct effect. The direct effect comprises that deviators form their own partition or a partition with other countries not actively involved in a deviation. The latter effect implies to join other coalitions. In the OMG any possible deviation is available to a subgroup of countries, in the ROMG deviators cannot join singletons without their consent and in the EMDG deviators can neither join singletons nor non-trivial coalitions without their consent. Thus, it is easier to sustain a NE or SNE in the EMDG than in the ROMG since the amount of possible deviations is smaller in the former than in the latter game, anything else being equal. The same is true when comparing ROMG and OMG. We now turn to the second comparison.
Proposition 3: Comparison of Equilibria in the EMDG, EMGG and EMHG
Let the set of Nash and strong Nash equilibrium coalition structures (NE and SNE) belonged to partition c in c, and is the partition of all remaining countries I\I T before and after the deviation. In the EMDG and EMGG a deviation has no effect on and hence
. In the EMDG a deviation implies that those coalitions to which the deviators belong stick together whereas in the EMGG they break up into singletons by the stronger degree of unanimity required forming a coalition. Thus, if we let , then in the EMDG 13 Taken together, we have for a deviator i c , :
T (1) In all three games the direct effect of deviations is the same: deviators cannot join other coalitions due to exclusivity and the partition that a group of countries can form is the same.
However, the indirect effect is different since the various degrees of unanimity required to form a coalition imply different reactions of the remaining players. In the EMDG there is no reaction, in the EMGG coalitions to which the deviators belonged break apart, and in the EMHG, additionally, all other coalitions break apart. Thus, the higher the degree of unanimity necessary to form coalitions, the higher is the implicit punishment in positive externality games after a deviation and hence the higher is the "degree of stability". We turn now to the last comparison.
Proposition 4: Comparison of Equilibria in the EMHG and EMIG
Let the set of Nash and strong Nash equilibrium coalition structures (NE and SNE) EMDG, EMGG, EMHG and EMIG) , respectively, then
C ( EMIG
Proof:
Follows from Proposition 2, 3 and 4 (Q.E.D.).
Proposition 5 stresses the relation between the rules of coalition formation and stability of agreements with an unambiguous relation (inclusion chain) between equilibria in the various coalition games.
Existence of Equilibrium Coalition Structures
The reason for considering not only strong Nash equilibrium (SNE) but also Nash equilibrium (NE) coalition structures in the previous subsection is that -at our level of generalityexistence of a NE is guaranteed in all games except in the open membership game whereas existence of a SNE can only be established in the exclusive membership I-game. We start establishing existence of a NE for which we need the following definition.
Definition 9: Individually Rational Coalition Structures
A coalition structure c is called individually rational if each player receives at least his payoff
in the singleton coalition structure, i.e., " iOEI:
w ( c , c ) w ({ i },1,...,1 ) It is evident that the set of individually rational coalition structures, henceforth abbreviated , is non-empty since the singleton coalition structure belongs to this set by definition.
Moreover, intuition suggests that there is a close relation between individually rational and Nash equilibrium coalition structures. Thus, we know that at least one element in the inclusion chain of SNE in Proposition 5 is none empty. 
Summary and Final Remarks
We analyzed coalition formation in the tradition of "new coalition theory" that has several advantages to former approaches. 1) The analysis is based on individual and not on aggregate payoffs of players. 2) Externalities among players and coalitions are fully captured. 3) A conceptual distinction between the rules of coalition formation and equilibrium is possible.
functions) that the aggregate payoff to a coalition is lower than the sum of coalition members´ payoffs in the singleton coalition structure and hence individual rationality may fail to hold. See the discussion in subsection 2.2. 4) Coalition formation is not restricted ex-ante to a single (non-trivial) coalition and hence the co-existence of multiple coalition is possible. 5) Stability can be defined in terms of multiple deviations where deviators may form any partition they want.
We considered six coalition games that can be interpreted as different institutional settings in which coalition formation takes place and/or different designs of treaty protocols. We compared stability in the six games under very general conditions, applying the concept of a Nash equilibrium and strong Nash equilibrium. We demonstrated that this is possible based on only one condition called positive externality property that holds in the global emission game without transfers but also for a large class of transfer schemes.
Though our results are derived from a stylized model and despite results may seem obvious when considering the proofs, they are interesting from a policy perspective. They suggest that exclusive membership may be conducive to stability of IEAs. Given that almost all protocols of existing IEAs allow non-signatories to join an IEA at any time they want suggests altering
this rule from open to exclusive membership for future IEAs. This basically would imply to turn a public good agreement into a club good agreement in terms of membership. Our results also suggest that a high degree of unanimity in terms of membership helps to stabilize an IEA whereas it is usually conjectured that unanimity leads to agreements of the lowest denominator type. The driving force in our model is that the higher the degree of unanimity required to form a coalition, the higher is the pressure on countries to accede to an agreement since a failure has severe consequences. Though in our model unanimity applies to membership and not to the level of emission reductions, our model indicates that the widespread application of unanimous decision rules in international politics may not always be a disadvantage and, in fact, may be a rational choice. In any case, our conclusion is in line with bargaining models that have analyzed the positive effect of unanimous decision rules in terms of the level of emission reduction and the policy instrument used to implement emission reduction targets (Endres 1997 and Finus/Rundshagen 1998a, b) .
Of course from an economic and ecological perspective it would be interesting to know what "more stability" means. This, however, requires more specific assumptions about payoff functions as this has be done for instance in the theoretical context by Finus/Rundshagen (2001) or in the empirical context by Eyckmans/Finus (2003) for some of the coalition games we discussed here. Of course, one could argue that more is always better than less stability if one assumes that additional equilibria in one game compared to an other game are only chosen by players if they lead to higher aggregate welfare and lower global emissions.
However, this would probably be a too simple view of the problem.
